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13 THE RISK OF DROUGHT 
Professor Nigel Arnell, Director of the Walker Institute for Climate System Research 
What do we want to avoid?
Drought is a major challenge to people, agriculture and economies across the world. Broadly speaking, there 
are four types of ‘drought’.
• A meteorological drought – a lack of precipitation
• An agricultural drought – a lack of water in the soil
• A hydrological drought – a deficit in river flows and groundwater levels
• A water resources drought – a deficit in the amount of water available for distribution to consumers 
(such as irrigators).
One type of drought does not necessarily map directly onto another. Droughts – of whatever type – also 
vary in their duration, intensity (amount of deficit) and spatial extent. It is therefore much more difficult to 
characterize both the ‘impact’ and the ‘risk’ of drought than the impact and risk of flooding. There are also 
many different indicators of drought, tailored to different characterizations of drought.
This section focuses on meteorological drought, and characterises drought on the basis of an indicator of 
accumulated deficits of precipitation. More particularly, it looks at the average proportion of cropland at any 
given time experiencing ‘extreme’ drought. We have defined ‘extreme drought’ for this purpose as being the 
level of precipitation deficit that occurs approximately 2% of the time in the current climate.i It is important 
to note that this measure does not take into account the effect of raised temperatures, which, by increasing 
rates of evaporation, will further increase the risk. 
How does the likelihood of drought change over time?
Figure D1 shows the proportion of croplandii affected by drought under high (red) and low (green) emissions 
pathways, for the globe as a whole and for four major regions, as a function of time. This is equivalent to the 
probability that a given part of that cropland is in drought, in any given year. 
For the high emissions pathway, the proportion of cropland exposed to drought increases by around 75% 
by 2050 and more than doubles by the end of the century, under the median estimate. On this pathway, the 
incidence of drought roughly triples in Southern Africa, and increases by about 50% in the US and South Asia, 
over the course of the century. For the low emissions pathway, the increases are much less. At the same time, 
what is very clear is that there is there is considerable uncertainty in the projections. The uncertainty ranges 
suggest that while in the best case, drought incidence could halve in some regions, in the worst case, it could 
increase by a factor of three or four. 
1. See Annex’
2. (assuming no change in total cropland area)
Figure D1: The proportion of regional cropland affected by drought with and without 
climate change. The plots show two climate pathways (RCP2.6 and RCP8.5). The solid 
line represents the median estimate of impact for each pathway, and the shaded areas 
show the 10% to 90% range.
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Figure D2: The risk that climate change increases by more than 50% the average annual area of 
cropland affected by ‘drought’, relative to the situation with no climate change, under the two 
climate pathways.
This uncertainty is illustrated in Figure D2, which shows the risk that climate change increases the average 
annual area of cropland in a region affected by drought by more than 50% in 2050 and 2100. By 2050, the 
probability is greater than 70% - under high emissions – in southern and northern Africa, the Middle East, 
Australasia, western Europe and central America. In contrast, there is a relatively low probability that climate 
change would increase drought extent in East Asia and Canada. Lower emissions reduce the risk, particularly 
by 2100.
What is a plausible worst case for changes in drought due to climate change?
At the global scale, there is a 10% probability that by 2050 the incidence of drought would have increased 
by 150%, and the plausible worst case would be an increase of 300% by the latter half of the century. The 
proportion of cropland affected by drought under the plausible worst case scenario more than doubles in 
every region (Figure D3) and in all except Canada and East Asia increases by a factor of at least three. The 
global worst case is not equivalent to the sum of the regional worst cases, because no one plausible climate 
scenario produces the biggest impact everywhere. 
Figure D3 is based on the assumption that all the climate models used to estimate impacts are equally 
plausible and that they span the range of potential regional climate changes. This is not necessarily the case, 
so the numbers are to be regarded as indicative.
2050: probability of cropland area 
affected by drought increasing by >50%
2100: probability of cropland area 
affected by drought increasing by >50%
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Figure D3: Plausible ‘worst case’ impacts of climate change in 2050 on exposure to 
drought. The graph shows the additional annual proportion of cropland affected by 
drought under the RCP8.5 climate pathway, relative to the proportion affected with no 
climate change. There is a 10% probability that the impact is greater than that shown 
by the blue dots, and the red dots show the maximum calculated impact. The average 
annual proportion of cropland affected by drought in the absence of climate change is 
just under 2%.
What do we know, what do we not know, and what do we think?
Estimates of how drought risk will change in the future are based on (i) projections of future regional climate 
change, (ii) projections of how these translate into changes in drought characteristics, and (iii) projections of 
future exposed land and people. There are uncertainties in all of these.
Projections of future regional climate change depend partly on the assumed rate of growth in emissions, 
and partly on projected changes in regional and seasonal precipitation. Climate model simulations typically 
show that whilst global precipitation goes up with climate change, there is strong variability across space. In 
general, wet regions get wetter, but dry regions get drier. However, the magnitude of the change in a region 
is uncertain, as are the boundaries of regions which see increases or decreases in rainfall. Temperature 
increases across all land areas with climate change, and this will exaggerate the effect of rainfall deficits by 
increasing evaporation.
The way in which changes in climate translate into changes in drought depends on local conditions. Most 
agricultural systems are tuned to local climatic conditions, so it is departures from those conditions that 
prove challenging. That is why our drought indicator is defined in relation to average local conditions, rather 
than being defined in absolute terms. However, different measures of drought are also possible to define, and 
these would give different indications of both current exposure and future risk.
Finally, the estimated future impacts on agriculture and society depend on changes in exposure to droughts 
and vulnerability to their effects. This will depend not only on population change, economic growth and the 
extent of croplands, but also on the degree to which drought mitigation measures (such as forecasting and 
warning, provision of supplementary water supplies or market interventions) are developed.
Production of this chapter was supported by the AVOID 2 programme (DECC) under contract 
reference 1104872.
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